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1 
Interest of Amici Curiae 
The undersigned (collectively Amici) are twenty-six professors 
of antitrust and sports law, who share an interest in effective 
competition policy in sports and other markets. Our specialties 
differ, and we hold varying perspectives, but we each consider 
affirmance important to correct a serious injury well within the 
concerns of antitrust law.1 
We also desire to explain our differences with certain respected 
colleagues, who have submitted two opposing briefs as Amici 
Curiae.2 
Summary of Argument 
Appellant’s opening brief is a remarkable document. While 
Amici can agree that “[t]his case is . . . about . . . how to regulate 
intercollegiate athletics . . . [and] who should [do it],” NCAA Br. at 
2, we think Appellant rather misapprehends American law in 
appointing itself in place of the U.S. Congress. Congress has already 
                                                 
1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No party, 
party’s counsel, or other person, other than Amici and their counsel, 
authored any part of it or contributed money to fund its preparation or 
submission. Fed. R. App. Proc. 29(c)(5). 
2 Specifically, the Brief for Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Appellant, filed by Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati 
(“Wilson Sonsini Br.”), and the Brief for Law and Economics and 
Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, filed by The 
Konkurrenz Group (“Konkurrenz Br.”). 
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2 
decided the question, in a way open to neither Appellant nor the 
courts to doubt, and its decision is that the primary American 
regulator for all sectors is competition. The sale of education and the 
sale of sports entertainment, along with most other businesses, fall 
well within that rule. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 
(1958) (“the [law’s] premise [is] that the unrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield . . . the lowest prices, the highest 
quality and the greatest material progress . . . But even were that 
premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by 
the Act is competition”); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
HANDBOOK ON THE SCOPE OF ANTITRUST 13-17 (2014) [“SCOPE 
HANDBOOK”]. Appellant happens not to be the first defendant to 
argue that its special circumstances require something different. 
Defendants of all kinds have so pled since the law’s very beginning, 
and, on the whole, they have found little judicial sympathy. Id. at 3-
9 & n.11. So, with respect, it is actually quite “appropriate” for 
antitrust to determine whether a product “could still be 
commercially popular if it became something different,” NCAA Br. 
at 60, and specifically if it became less constrained by a conspiracy 
of its sellers. 
On a more specific level, Appellant and its amici raise only one 
question that does not just re-litigate the facts or depend on very 
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3 
unlikely legal theories of applicability3 or injury.4 They question 
whether the district court correctly applied the rule of reason, and in 
                                                 
3 Appellant briefly argues that the challenged rules are not even 
subject to antitrust, see NCAA Br. at 32-35, despite having waived the 
argument below, see Pls. Br. at 35. It cites to support in opinions of the 
Third and Sixth Circuits, see NCAA Br. at 32-35 (citing Smith v. NCAA, 
139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), and Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 
2008)), but they are grossly incorrect as a matter of law, see, e.g., 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1260b (2d 
ed. 2000) (“No knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that big-
time college football programs” are not commerce subject to the Sherman 
Act); SCOPE HANDBOOK, supra, at 13-17; Marc Edelman, The District Court 
Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small 
Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander 
Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2341-42 (2014). 
Indeed one of Appellant’s own principal authorities rejects the 
argument emphatically. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 340 (7th Cir. 2012). 
4 Appellant’s challenge to antitrust injury is odd indeed. See NCAA 
Br. at 35-43; Konkurrenz Br. at 5-21. Aside from its preclusion by Circuit 
law, see NCAA Br. at 38 (acknowledging conflict with Keller v. Electronic 
Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013)), it depends on the claim that elite 
college athletes, whose talent is the principal input in a several-billion-
dollar industry, could find no way to capitalize on the value of video 
broadcast. That seems unlikely. In any case, “[i]t is enough that the 
illegality is shown to be a material cause of the injury; plaintiff need not 
exhaust all possible alternative sources of injury,” Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Res., Inc., 395 U.S. 114, 114 n.9 (1969), and, therefore, the 
factfinder may “conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference” 
that plaintiff was injured so long as there is “proof of defendant’s 
wrongful acts and their tendency to injure,” Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 
327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). Moreover, the antitrust injury requirement is 
more lenient where only injunctive relief is sought. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort 
of Colo, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 (1986); 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 799-800 (7th ed. 2012). 
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4 
particular whether it properly analyzed the rule’s requirement of 
“less restrictive alternatives” (“LRA”). 
Amici urge affirmance for three principal reasons. First, we 
elaborate a point above, to dispel Appellant’s suggestion that 
antitrust somehow does not belong here. Second, we show that 
ordinary rule of reason treatment was appropriate. Relying rather 
daringly on a case that it overwhelmingly lost, Appellant asks this 
Court to find within NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85 (1984), a rule that its “amateurism” or “eligibility” restraints 
are “valid . . . as a matter of law.” NCAA Br. at 14, 22. Board of 
Regents did not say that, and even Appellant’s own amici admit it. 
See Wilson Sonsini Br. at 5 & n.2. 
Last, but most important, having shown that no special rule 
applies, we show ample grounds to affirm within the district court’s 
opinion. Of fundamental importance is the court’s finding that 
anticompetitive harm outweighed the minor benefits that Appellant 
could show. That alone, on any statement of the rule of reason, was 
a sufficient basis for liability. (And plaintiff does not then just lose, 
contrary to view apparently taken by Appellant and its amici, 
because it did not offer some satisfactory LRA.) 
Appellant and its amici would fail to discredit that result with 
the purported technical missteps they claim to have found, even if 
there actually were any. If there, it would at least be 
understandable. Leading current works on the rule of reason 
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suggest it remains confused and controversial in its details, in part 
because it has undergone substantial change without very clear 
Supreme Court guidance, because full rule of reason cases virtually 
never reach the merits, and because, as a result, appellate 
elaboration remains fairly sparse. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of 
Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 827, 829-31, 834-36 (2009) [“Carrier, Empirical Update”]; Gabriel 
A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in 
Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561 (2009). Indeed, the 
present case has generated not one, or even two, but three separate 
law professors’ briefs, collecting the views of more than forty 
academic specialists, and we differ on its details. But missteps by the 
district court, to whatever extent they even occurred, would also be 
a poor basis for reversal. The opinion discloses a perfectly adequate 
basis on which to affirm.5 Failure to do so, for no more than quibbles 
suggested by Appellant and its amici, would waste years of 
                                                 
5 Noted scholars have already said so in the law review literature, 
and the analysis here largely tracks theirs. See Edelman, supra note 3, at 
2338-43; Stephen F. Ross & Wayne S. DeSarbo, A Rapid Reaction to 
O’Bannon: The Need for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act to Overly 
Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, 118 PENN STATE L. REV. PENN STATIM 
(forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/penn-statim /a-rapid-reaction-to-
obannon-the-need-for-analytics-in-applying-the-sherman-act-to-overly-
restrictive-joint-venture-schemes/. Also, see generally Daniel E. Lazaroff, 
The NCAA and Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust 
Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329 (2007). 
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6 
litigation and a three-week trial on the merits, addressing an injury 
well within the law’s concerns.6 
Argument 
I. THESE PLAINTIFFS’ PROTECTION IS A FITTING 
ANTITRUST OBJECTIVE, A FACT UNCHANGED BY 
APPELLANT’S NON-ECONOMIC VALUE 
JUDGMENTS 
To some large extent Appellant has attempted to make this 
something other than the relatively easy fact case that it is, and to 
make it about whether antitrust has any business regulating 
Appellant’s affairs. It does. 
Appellant and its members may well be the storied and public-
regarding actors that Appellant describes, and Amici need enter no 
disagreements whether its work was well or badly motivated. Cf. 
Pls. Br. at 4-9. There remains more than enough proof of harms of 
concern to the Sherman Act, among the aims of which is to stop 
coerced wealth transfers. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the 
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation 
                                                 
6 Courts should affirm on any available alternative grounds, where 
the record is adequate and the only meaningful disputes are legal. Golden 
Nugget, Inc. v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 828 F.2d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 
1987); Jewel Cos., Inc. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Nw., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1564-
65 (9th Cir. 1984). The court below compiled an extensive record after 
many years of litigation and a full trial on the merits, and Appellant 
raises no meaningful dispute of material fact. 
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Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1999) (leading article, showing 
wealth transfer to have been a primary evil at which Sherman Act 
aimed). As a Nobel Prize-winning economist once wrote, 
Appellant’s “self-righteous rhetoric and ostensible good intentions . 
. . fail to hide its monopoly power and the inequities it fosters,” 
Gary S. Becker, The NCAA: A Cartel in Sheepskin Clothing, BUSINESS 
WEEK, Sept. 14, 1987, at 24, and the nation’s leading work on 
monopsony says that its rules just “transfer[] wealth from poor 
ghetto residents to rich colleges. At the same time, it manages to 
maintain the moral high ground by convincing the majority that 
such controls are good and payment is evil.” ROGER D. BLAIR & 
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 n.3 
(2010). 
Such a matter is ripe for antitrust attention, and Appellant’s 
many value arguments actually just prove that fact more clearly. 
Very nearly its first words on appeal state its fear that if it cannot 
constrain “the commercial pressures of college sports,” then “an 
avocation [might] become a profession . . . .” NCAA Br. at 2. Such a 
thing may or may not occur, but it doesn’t matter. As a celebrated 
first principle of antitrust, preventing such an outcome is precisely 
the kind of policy judgment that private persons are not permitted 
to make. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679, 690 (1978) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 
65 (1911) (“restraints of trade within the purview of the statute . . . 
  Case: 14-16601, 01/28/2015, ID: 9400343, DktEntry: 66, Page 14 of 38
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[can]not be taken out of that category by indulging in general 
reasoning as to the expediency or nonexpediency of having made 
the contracts, or the wisdom or want of wisdom of the statute which 
prohibited their being made.”)). So, to fear “commercial pressures,” 
and seek antitrust clemency because exposure to one’s competitors 
threatens values other than price, quality, or output, is just to 
concede that one is engaged in a business, properly subject to the 
discipline of markets. 
And so, in effect, the elite, rarified athletics at issue are a 
business in all but name, which only by historic accident happened 
to find its roots in universities. Or at least they are as far as the 
federal antitrust laws are concerned, and only its dictates matter 
here.7 Board of Regents itself affirmed as a fact that “the NCAA and 
its member institutions are . . . organized to maximize revenues,” 
and are “[no] less likely to restrict output [to maximize profit] . . . 
                                                 
7 Appellant begs rather a large question in assuming that it can just 
declare that its product is an “amateur” product, and then, by tautology, 
ban anything at odds with it. Board of Regents admittedly said that some 
restraints are needed “if the product is to be available at all.” 468 U.S. at 
101. But could Appellant have simply announced that its product was 
“non-televised football,” and then banned all broadcasts because, 
otherwise, non-televised football would not “be available at all”? Board of 
Regents suggests not. Under antitrust, it is markets responsive to 
consumer tastes that determine whether a product will be sold and in 
what form. See id. at 116-17 (rejecting Appellant’s goal of protecting live 
game attendance from competition from televised games, because it 
rested improperly “on a fear that the product will not prove sufficiently 
attractive”). 
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than would be a for-profit entity,” 468 U.S. at 101 n.22. And as a 
business, it generates several billion dollars per year, extracted from 
the players that principally generate it, in exchange only for 
scholarships valued at most at about $30,000 per year, and often 
much less. See Stephen F. Ross, Radical Reform of Intercollegiate 
Athletics: Antitrust and Public Policy Implications, 86 TUL. L. REV. 933, 
954 n.54 (2012). 
Appellant does not explain why it needs clemency that many 
other unusual or “special” markets are not given. Antitrust applies 
without limitation to sports in general, Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y. v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959), and to higher education, United 
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1993) (so holding, 
and applying ordinary rule of reason, because “[t]he exchange of 
money for services . . . is a quintessential commercial transaction.”); 
see also Mass. Sch. of Law v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997); United 
States v. ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996), and it makes no 
difference that a defendant may take non-profit form, Board of 
Regents, 468 U.S. at 101 n.22. So why are college sports so special? 
Higher education in general is surely as delicate and freighted with 
public concern, and it is sold for the most part by non-profit and 
public-spirited entities. But where schools conspire on scholarships 
they must face at least ordinary rule of reason scrutiny. Brown 
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University, 5 F.3d at 679.8 And as for the commercializing pressures 
to which Appellant mainly points, why are college sports so 
different than all the other markets in which young talent is valued? 
As Becker asked, “[w]ould anyone advocate a cap on the earnings of 
young traders on Wall Street so that they don’t get into trouble from 
having a lot of money?” Becker, supra, at 24. 
Of course, there could be reasons actually relevant to antitrust 
why Appellant’s restraints should be permitted—that is, there could 
be procompetitive justifications. But knowing whether there are is the 
whole purpose of the rule of reason. Appellant was given the full 
benefit of it below, and it lost. 
II. THE ORDINARY RULE OF REASON APPLIES 
As a preliminary matter, Appellant disputes even that the 
ordinary rule of reason should apply. While it is not clear exactly 
what rule this Court is supposed to find in Board of Regents,9 
                                                 
8 As if confirming these points by inclusio unius, Congress later 
explicitly exempted the scholarship agreements in Brown University, but 
only very narrowly. See SCOPE HANDBOOK, supra, at 357-58 (discussing 
Need-Based Education Act); see also Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 106 n.28 
(drawing a similar inference from Congress’s adoption of a narrow 
exemption for televised professional football). 
9 Appellant mainly claims that its eligibility or amateurism restraints 
are “valid . . . as a matter of law,” NCAA Br. at 14, 22, apparently 
meaning that they are per se legal. In perhaps slightly different terms it 
sometimes says they are merely “procompetitive as a matter of law,” id. 
at 24, suggesting that they could still be overcome by a satisfactory LRA. 
At some other times it uses presumption language, as when it says those 
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Appellant apparently believes that case to have held its rules for 
“amateurism” or “eligibility” to be per se legal.10 It further believes 
that courts may revisit that rule under no circumstances, no matter 
how much times change, or how much evidence or economic theory 
might show the speculative, a priori dicta in Board of Regents to have 
been factually incorrect. It says the rule is so sacred that only the 
Supreme Court or Congress could change it.11 
Board of Regents did not say any of that. That is fairly clear on 
the face of it. Why would the Court adopt a sui generis rule 
governing perhaps one or a handful of defendants, in a case in 
which it was not even in issue or required for decision, precluding 
further consideration of matters that remain hotly disputed among 
economists?12 And why would the Court do so in an age in which it 
                                                                                                                                               
rules should be judged in the “twinkling of an eye,” id. at 27-28, and 
among the lower court cases it cites, none describes Appellant’s Board of 
Regents dicta as creating more than a presumption. See, e.g., Agnew, 683 
F.3d at 341 (some NCAA rules are “presumptively procompetitive”). 
Finally, at still other times it says only that “full rule-of-reason analysis is 
inappropriate,” id. at 43. 
10 See NCAA Br. at 14 (purporting Board of Regents to hold NCAA 
amateurism rules “procompetitive and therefore valid under the 
Sherman Act as a matter of law”). 
11 See NCAA Br. at 28 (“even if college sports has changed so 
dramatically since Board of Regents that the Supreme Court’s analysis no 
longer holds, the district court (and this Court) would still be bound by 
the decision.”). 
12 If the conflicting expert views in this case itself were not proof 
enough, consider the competing amicus briefs of economists filed in 
American Needle. Compare American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 2009 WL 4247983 
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so strongly prefers fulsome fact evaluation in antitrust, and 
disfavors per se rules? See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007); Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977). 
It makes much more sense to read the dicta in question as just 
the Court’s explanation why it would soften its treatment for certain 
restraints, when under some decades of prior law they would have 
been illegal per se. Presumably, the Court elaborated a bit because of 
the exceptional ferment in the law of Sherman Act § 1 at the time, 
and the uncertainty the Court itself had caused. See, e.g., Lawrence 
A. Sullivan, The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 
75 CAL. L. REV. 835 (1987). The Court merely explained—in 
language, incidentally, that was not the unmitigated praise that 
Appellant implies13—that it found enough uncertainty in the possibly 
                                                                                                                                               
(2009) (Brief of Amici Curiae) (brief of fifteen eminent economists 
reviewing substantial theoretical and empirical evidence supporting 
defendant), with American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 2009 WL 3090453 (2009) 
(Brief of Amici Curiae) (brief of twenty other, similarly eminent 
economists, reviewing similarly substantial evidence, but supporting 
plaintiff). 
13 The Court found Appellant to be a profit-maximizing entity as 
dangerous to markets as any other, 468 U.S. at 101 n.23, one holding not 
only “market” but “monopoly” power at least as to television broadcast 
rights, id. at 111, and accordingly stressed that whatever “good motives 
[it might have] will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice,” 
id. n.22. Moreover, the same Court—indeed, the same Justice—would 
later write that while “two teams are needed to play a football game, not 
all . . . cooperation [is] necessary . . . . Members of any cartel could insist 
that their cooperation is necessary to produce the ‘cartel product’ and 
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special economics of sports leagues to give Appellant the benefit of 
a little bit of doubt. See 468 U.S. at 101-03, 117. The Court explicitly 
offered the passage most crucial to Appellant only to explain “[o]ur 
decision not to apply a per se rule . . . .” Id. at 117. 
In other words, the “ample latitude” that Appellant requires, id. 
at 119, is only something less than per se treatment. Full rule of 
reason, a standard much more forgiving than the very strict, quick-
look treatment Appellant actually got in Board of Regents, is “ample 
latitude.” 
Furthermore, despite Appellant’s characterizations, the lower 
courts do not read Board of Regents to hold any sports league rules to 
be per se legal, and even Appellant’s short list of citations give it 
only limited and problematic support. Its principal case, Agnew v. 
NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir 2012), suggests only that when a league 
restraint concerns “eligibility,” courts have “license” to find for 
defendant early on, because such restraints are “presumptively 
procompetitive.” Id. at 342. Moreover, even were the slate truly 
clean in the Ninth Circuit, this Court should not follow a case like 
Agnew. It merely affirmed a dismissal, on the bare pleadings, 
whereas the court below made well supported findings suggesting 
that Agnew’s a priori assessment of league restraints may have been 
quite wrong. Agnew further depends on an unworkable distinction 
                                                                                                                                               
compete with other products.” American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 
199 n.7 (2010). 
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based on concepts—“amateurism” and “eligibility”—with no 
obvious boundaries, and it would not simplify or rationalize 
litigation as is suggested.14 
But in any case, the slate is not clean. Appellant’s reading of 
Board of Regents is directly precluded by Circuit law. Hairston v. Pac. 
10 Conf., 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996), applied the full rule of 
reason to a factually indistinguishable restraint—penalties for 
violation of amateurism rules—without discussion of any 
presumptions or special rules, and it cited Board of Regents as 
authority for it. Id. at 1318-19. See also Tanaka v. Univ. S. Cal., 252 F.3d 
1059, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying full rule of reason to Pac 10 
Conference restraint on student-athlete transfers among conference 
member schools). 
And finally, even were some such presumption to apply here, it 
wouldn’t actually matter. It does not make a bench verdict 
reversible that a court could have foreshortened fact inquiry under a 
presumption, but instead gave plaintiff the benefit of trial. That 
would be tantamount to allowing challenge to a verdict because a 
court denied dismissal or summary judgment. Such challenge is not 
                                                 
14 Virtually any restraint could be said in some sense to benefit 
“amateurism.” In Board of Regents itself, a nearly naked output restraint 
held illegal under a very strict, quick-look review was defended by three 
different judges as useful to preserve amateurism. 468 U.S. at 120-36 
(White, J., dissenting) (joined Justice Rehnquist); 707 F.2d 1147, 1163 
(Barrett, J., dissenting). 
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permitted in this Circuit. Locricchio v. Legal Servs. Corp., 833 F.2d 
1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1987) (“it would be . . . unjust to deprive a 
party of a . . . verdict after the evidence was fully presented”). 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE FINDING OF 
LIABILITY UNDER THE RULE OF REASON 
Finally, there being no standard of per se legality or pro-
defendant quick look or any other special rule, what remains is to 
ask whether full rule of reason analysis was appropriately 
performed below. 
A. The Findings Below Sufficiently Support Liability 
Under the Rule of Reason, However They May Have 
Been Explained 
The undersigned Amici do not all agree on all doctrinal details 
surrounding rule-of-reason analysis, and hardly could we. Leading 
scholars find its details still quite confused and uncertain. See 
Carrier, Empirical Update, supra, at 829-31, 834-36; Feldman, supra. 
We agree, however, that the approach below was generally sound 
and that the result plainly can and should be affirmed, either as the 
district court actually explained, or on adequate alternative grounds 
sufficiently supported in its findings. See Edelman, supra, at 2338-43 
(explaining sufficiency of opinion’s evidentiary support); Ross & 
DeSarbo, supra (same). 
  Case: 14-16601, 01/28/2015, ID: 9400343, DktEntry: 66, Page 22 of 38
16 
In general terms, as Appellant and its amici concede, see NCAA 
Br. at 43-44; Wilson Sonsini Br. at 4-5, the three-part burden-shifting 
framework deployed below is established in the caselaw of both this 
Circuit, see O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985 (quoting Tanaka, 252 F.3d 
at 1063), and the other Circuits, 1 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 
supra note 4, at 70-80; Carrier, Empirical Update, supra, at 829-31, 834-
36; Feldman, supra, at 581-86. 
Amici agree further that the case was largely over at step two of 
the three-step analysis. The following explanation of the result is an 
adequate basis to affirm, and is fully supported by the court’s 
findings. Having found Plaintiffs to meet their prima facie burden 
on anticompetitive harm, the district court rejected almost all of 
Appellant’s rebuttal for want of proof.15 And though it found there 
to be two minor benefits from the entirety of the challenged 
restrictions, it found both of them too small to outweigh the harm of 
an outright ban on licensing revenue. Specifically: (1) While the 
court found amateurism to “play a limited role in driving consumer 
demand” for college sports, that “might justify a restriction on large 
payments,”16 that benefit “[could] not justify the rigid prohibition on 
                                                 
15 The court rejected entirely the goals of competitive balance and 
increased opportunity for sports play, rejecting Appellant’s evidence that 
its restraint produced any such benefits. 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973-79, 981-82. 
16 Strictly speaking, this finding reflects some tension in the caselaw, 
as it uses a benefit in one market to justify harms in another. Compare 
Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1110 (1st Cir. 1994) (benefits in the 
marketing of football could justify harms in the market for NFL club 
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compensating student-athletes . . . with any share of licensing 
revenue . . . .” 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001 (emphasis added). (2) The court 
likewise found that integration of student-athletes into their campus 
communities could improve the education product they purchase, 
but found Appellant’s outright ban “[not] necessary to achieve these 
benefits.” Therefore, while “[l]imited restrictions on student-athlete 
compensation may help schools achieve this narrow procompetitive 
goal[,] . . . the NCAA may not use [it] . . . to justify its sweeping 
prohibition on any student-athlete compensation . . . from licensing 
revenue . . . .” Id. at 1003. 
At that point, the case was over. Liability had been found, 
because, while not all of Appellant’s justifications were completely 
rejected, none of them could overcome the damage of an outright 
ban on licensing revenue. All that remained was a remedy. And 
while there followed discussion of “less restrictive alternatives”—a 
discussion on which Appellant and its amici focus much attention, 
see NCAA Br. at 44-45; Wilson Sonsini Br. at 6-16—its sole purpose 
was to justify the remedy. As such, that discussion is irrelevant here, 
for three reasons. (1) District courts enjoy broad remedial discretion 
in antitrust. Pac. Coast Ag. Export Ass’n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 
                                                                                                                                               
securities), with Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(benefit of competitive balance in marketing of football cannot justify 
labor market restraints). It would hardly matter, however, because if the 
court were wrong it would just mean that this justification failed entirely. 
Appellant not surprisingly leaves it unchallenged. 
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F.2d 1126, 1209 (9th Cir. 1975); 1 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 
supra note 4, at 801-02. (2) The court did no more than adopt a 
remedy recommended by Plaintiffs. See 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1004. (3) 
Appellant has explicitly waived any challenge to the remedy on this 
appeal. See NCAA Br. at 5 (issues presented). 
Shortly after this discussion, the court said something perhaps 
somewhat confusing, but that is also easy to explain. It said that 
Appellant had “produced sufficient evidence” to have “met its 
burden under the rule of reason” and therefore that “the burden 
shift[ed] back to Plaintiffs . . . .” 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1004. But there is no 
real confusion. The court actually only said that “preventing schools 
from paying . . . large sums of money” could produce some benefit, 
and accordingly Appellant “met its burden . . . [only] to that extent . . 
. .” Id. (emphasis added). 
B. Appellant and Its Amici Fail to Discredit the 
Analysis Below 
Whatever differences Appellant or its amici may have with the 
opinion’s language, they are matters of non-material detail at best 
and some are seriously incorrect. They identify no meaningfully 
reversible, non-harmless error of law in the court’s analysis. 
First, this Court should reject their varying versions of the 
burden-shifting formula, because they would gut the rule of reason. 
Their several verbal formulations actually change subtly throughout 
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their papers, in ways that could differ in material respects,17 and 
they are further confused by apparent mischaracterizations of what 
the district court actually held.18 But they seem ultimately to imply 
that a defendant can meet its burden by putting on any evidence, of 
any kind or character, see NCAA Br. at 54; Wilson Sonsini Br. at 2-3, 
7, that relates to some possible business justification, no matter how 
far removed from the actual restraint at issue in the antitrust 
litigation.19 On that view, no plaintiff could win without proof of 
some LRA that meets this Circuit’s standards.20 
                                                 
17 Wilson Sonsini Br. at 2 (arguing that Appellant met its burden by 
showing its restraint to “bear a reasonable relationship” to legitimate 
benefit); id. (arguing that Appellant “met its burden of establishing a link 
between [its] restrictions” and legitimate benefit); id. at 2-3 (arguing that 
the “restrict[ion] . . . was reasonably necessary to the [procompetitive] 
justifications”); see also id. at 7 (quoting, as proof that Plaintiffs were 
required to show LRA, district court’s finding that Appellant “produced 
sufficient evidence to support an inference that some circumscribed 
restrictions . . . may yield procompetitive benefits”) (emphasis added in 
all cases). 
18 Both Appellant and the Wilson Sonsini Brief appear at times to 
claim that the district court found Appellant fully to have justified an 
outright ban on licensing revenue through two of its proposed 
justifications. See Wilson Sonsini Br. at 12 (claiming the district court to 
have “found [Appellant’s restraint] reasonably necessary to a valid 
business purpose.”); cf. NCAA Br. at 54 (“the district court found the 
challenged rules [to] have procompetitive benefits,” triggering Plaintiff’s 
duty to prove an LRA). The district court explicitly held that Appellant’s 
outright ban on licensing revenue was not supported by any of its 
proposed justifications, even the two that it did not reject entirely. See 7 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1001, 1003. 
19 At one point they rather oddly cite a leading current paper for this 
claim, even though that paper argues emphatically for quite the opposite. 
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That is not the law, nor could it be. Any defendant can imagine 
some legitimate goal for any restraint, and can come up with some 
evidence for it. Thus, a plaintiff might show serious anticompetitive 
injury, with overwhelming evidence, but then lose because it was 
rebutted by some speculative possibility of sparsely supported 
benefit, and then failed to dream up an LRA satisfactory under this 
Circuit’s test. 
Requiring proof of an LRA is only logically plausible if there is 
some balancing of plaintiff’s and defendant’s proof that occurs 
before or separate from the obligation to show an LRA. Requiring it 
as a separate, necessary, dispositive obligation, regardless of the 
quality of defendant’s evidence, would permit illogical outcomes 
like those above. Moreover, this Court seems fairly clearly to have 
rejected such a view already. Where plaintiff has carried its initial 
burden, it does not just lose the case even if it fails completely to 
show an adequate LRA. If that occurs, “[then] we [simply] reach the 
                                                                                                                                               
See Wilson Sonsini Br. at 10 n.4 (citing Feldman, supra, which argues that 
LRA should be removed entirely as a dispositive element of the rule of 
reason, and used only for limited evidentiary purposes). 
20 In this Circuit an LRA must be “substantially less restrictive” than 
the challenged restraint, it must be “virtually as effective in serving the 
[defendant’s] legitimate objective,” and it must be able to do all that 
“without significantly increased cost.” County of Tuolumne v. Sonora 
Community Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2001); see Feldman, 
supra, at 585 (noting this Circuit’s uncommonly tough LRA requirement). 
Academic amici claim, on top of all that, that it must also use some 
different “method” than the challenged restraint, though they do so 
without support. Wilson Sonsini Br. at 12. 
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balancing stage.” County of Tuolumne, 236 F.3d at 1160; Michael A. 
Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. 
REV. 1265, 1343-44 [“Carrier, Real Rule of Reason”]. 
And indeed, many sports antitrust cases have done just what 
the district court did here. They recognized that defendants’ 
legitimate interests might warrant some sort of reasonable restraint, 
but found the challenged ones to be overly restrictive. In none of 
these cases did the court insist that the plaintiff demonstrate some 
precise alternative.21 
So, if Appellant and its amici mean that a defendant wins when 
it can put on any rebuttal evidence, against any plaintiff that cannot 
or does not show a sufficient LRA, they are mistaken. If that is not 
what they mean, then they acknowledge that defendant must make 
some actual, meaningful evidentiary showing to the satisfaction of 
the trier of fact. In fact Appellant’s amici do seem to acknowledge 
that a defendant loses if it “fail[s] to proffer and support a valid 
justification after competitive harm has been shown.” Wilson 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(recognizing certain possible benefits, but holding restraint illegal 
because they could have been achieved with LRA); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. 
P’ship. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 874 F. Supp. 844, 861 (N.D. Ill. 1995), rev’d 
on other grounds, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding outright restraints 
illegal, though recognizing some legitimate benefit, because of possibility 
of LRAs, including team salary caps, revenue sharing, and the college 
draft); McNeil v. NFL, 1992 WL 315292, at *5 (D. Minn. 1992) (instructing 
jury that restraint would be illegal, even if some benefit were shown, if 
benefits could be achieved by restraints used in other sports). 
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Sonsini Br. at 8 (emphasis added). But the district court explicitly 
found Appellant to fail at its burden in just that way, as a matter of 
fact, with respect to both the justifications that were not rejected 
completely. See 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1003-04. 
Second, academic amici say the district court “read what 
amounts to a ‘least restrictive alternative’ inquiry into the rule of 
reason.” Wilson Sonsini Brief at 3 (emphasis added). But as was 
carefully explained in a leading paper, cited in that brief itself, see id. 
at 10 n.4 (citing Feldman, supra), the distinction between “less” and 
“least” restrictive alternatives is purely semantic and unimportant. 
Logically, so long as a plaintiff can win by showing some less 
restrictive alternative, then no restraint is safe from challenge unless 
it is the least restrictive one. See Feldman, supra, at 584-86, 605-06; 
Carrier, Real Rule of Reason, supra, at 1337-38. 
C. Criticism of the LRA Analysis Adds No Basis for 
Reversal 
In the end, Appellant and its amici appear to be most frustrated 
by the regulatory character of the district court’s injunction. We 
express no opinion on that matter, except that it has no relevance on 
this appeal. Liability was properly found without it, and Appellant 
waived challenge to it. If anything, those frustrations go to whether 
LRA analysis should be part of the rule of reason at all, and some 
have urged it should not be. See Feldman, supra, at 586-624 (arguing 
that LRA is incorrigibly problematic, appears to have no basis in 
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Supreme Court authority, and should be discarded). But whatever 
may be the right course as a matter of policy, this case would be the 
wrong forum to resolve it, as the LRA remains a component of the 
analysis under Circuit law, and in any case it has nothing to do with 
the finding of liability. Even if the LRA were discarded entirely, 
Appellant would have lost this case for failure to rebut the finding 
of anticompetitive harm. As the district court held, Plaintiffs’ 
showing of harm outweighed even the two procompetitive effects 
that it did not reject completely. At that point, the case was at an 
end. 
Conclusion 
There being sufficient independent grounds to affirm the 
finding of liability, in a case with an ample record and no 
meaningful disputes of fact, and in which only liability and not 
remedy is contested, this Court should affirm. It should do so even 
if it agrees that there may be technical uncertainties or imperfections 
in the district court opinion. 
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